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ABSTRACT

A study investigated whether receivers who detect senders behaving deceitfully will automatically become more resistent to the message being presented. By developing predictions derived from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), the study hypothesized that only noninvolved receivers would respond negatively to deceptive nonverbal cues in a message. Subjects, 160 college students, were told that the study was examining advertising effects and were told they would see a videotape that contained several ads. Half of the students were induced to become involved with the one of the ads by a promise of a free product, the other half were told that the target ad was not properly representing the product. In addition, the target ad had been manipulated so that in one version the speaker avoided eye contact, did not smile, and shifted posture--all behaviors associated with deception. After viewing the videotape, the subjects completed a questionnaire that dealt with the ads and the program, with their television viewing habits, and with their responses to the ads. Using a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design, the study found that the speaker who engaged in deceptive behavior received only negative appraisals from the subjects who initially cared very little about the product. Conversely, subjects who saw the speaker as being highly relevant tended to base their evaluations on the strength of the arguments the speaker used to construct the message. (FL)

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An Examination of Behavioral Responses to Stereotypical Deceptive Displays

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Much of the contemporary work on deception in communication has been based on an assumption that should a receiver detect a sender behaving deceitfully, then the listener will automatically become more resistant to the message. This study suggests that such a contention is myopic and lacks empirical grounding. Further since persuasive contexts are varied and distinct, it is suggested that there is a need for a theoretical interface between the persuasion and nonverbal literatures. By developing predictions derived from the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), this study predicted that only non-involved receivers would respond negatively to deceptive nonverbal cues. Because the ELM contends that involved receivers are prone to attend the message and not the manner of delivery, deceptive displays were predicted to have only a minimum influence on these respondents' overall ratings. Using a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design the investigation found the predicted relationships between deception and persuasive influence. Sources who engaged in deceptive displays only received negative appraisals from receivers who initially cared very little about the topic. Conversely, participants who saw the subject as being highly relevant, tended to base their evaluations on the strength of the arguments that the speaker used to construct the message.

An Examination of Behavioral Responses to
Stereotypical Deceptive Displays

During the five years since Knapp and Comadena (1979) called for more research to investigate the nature of deceptive communication, most of the works have centered on identifying those nonverbal cues that constitute the best index to a speaker's insincerity. Several writers have been able to demonstrate a correspondence between the vocal variations employed during communication encounters and the source's attempts to deceive receivers. Changes in a sender's rate of delivery (Apple et al., 1979; De Paulo et al., 1981), the number of speech errors (Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Kraut, 1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Streeter et al., 1977), the hesitancy in his/her voice (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980), or variances in pitch (Apple et al., 1979; Streeter et al., 1977) have all been reported to be indicative of deception. Other scholars have chosen to examine non-vocal indicators. They found that a speaker engaging in deception tended to avoid eye contact (Hemsley & Doob, 1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980), smiled less (Friedman, 1979; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Zuckerman et al., 1979), used more adaptors (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980), and shifted his/her posture more often (Kraut & Poe, 1980; Streeter et al., 1977) than sources not attempting to deceive an audience.

Despite these findings, however, there has been little work that has investigated the repercussions of being considered dishonest to a speaker's overall persuasiveness. It seems to be generally assumed by contemporary researchers, that once an insincere speaker has been unmasked, the receiver will automatically refuse to comply with any of the source's behavioral requests. The inordinate amount of research invested in identifying those behavioral representations of deception, clearly suggests that mere identification of lying

by a receiver is tantamount to rejecting a message. While such an assumption may be accurate it has yet to be empirically tested.

Moreover, the previous work that has sought to explain the behavioral consequences of deceptive acts has been narrowly restricted to the types of lies being portrayed. Although falsehoods initiated with good intentions were found to be more acceptable to receivers than other types of deceit (Maier & Lavrakas, 1976), no studies have tried to explain the impact deception plays on a speaker's persuasiveness. It has been traditionally accepted that speakers who lie are not as persuasive as those who tell the truth. This generalization, however, lacks a theoretical grounding.

No attempts have been made to relate deceptive nonverbal behaviors with the contemporary theories of persuasion. If deceit is correlated with increased resistance then such explanations should be possible and would be valuable in developing a better understanding of both nonverbal and persuasive communication processes. By comprehending such relationships, the effects of questionable witnesses' testimony on a jury would be better understood and allow for a more equitable judicial system. The interface between deception and persuasion could better explain the effects an expert's testimony has on a congressional committee and permit elected officials to evaluate more appropriately the claims of such inputs and hopefully yield a higher quality of legislation. Or even voter's appraisals of a political candidate's professions of being the best qualified for an elective office could be more fully appreciated if the receivers knew the speaker was trying to be both deceptive and persuasive.

In 1981, Petty and Cacioppo developed a systems approach to persuasion predicaced on Greenwald's (1968) earlier work with cognitive responses. Their Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) assumed that audience members rarely listened

to speakers with complete passivity and often generated some evaluative standards against which a source's message could be measured. They emphasized that these thought processes could subsequently be used to predict the directions a recipient might alter his/her attitude towards the topic. The model suggested that attitude change would occur vis-a-vis a central or peripheral route.

Receivers exposed to messages would need to have both the ability to process information (have the mental abilities to comprehend the symbolic code) and the motivation (be intrinsically interested in the topic) to allow for the long term attitude change afforded exclusively through the model's central path. Individuals following this route theoretically form opinions (responses) based on comparisons between their existing cognitive structures and the incoming messages. These comparisons might be favorable (pro-arguments), negative (counterarguments) or neutral (neither favorable or unfavorable). As Greenwald's earlier work predicted, when the cognitions generated compared favorably or when few negative cognitions were formed, long-term attitude change was likely. Conversely, if a large number of negative arguments were paired with a message, then the negative opinions became entrenched, yielding no attitude change and even stronger resistance to future persuasive attempts on the recipient. If either ability or motivation to process a message were missing, Petty (1981) argued that any persuasion that occurred would be temporary (or short-lasting) and would be derived from the peripheral path.

Receivers following the peripheral route of the ELM were predicted to shift their opinions based on the persuasive cues present while the topic was being processed. The mode of presentation, the strength of demand characteristics in the setting, and/or attributes made about the source were felt to be the best predictors of attitude change when either ability or motivation to

process a message were absent. Opinion changes produced through the peripheral route appeared to be temporary. Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, and Petty (1976) found that while subjects were likely to change their opinions on complex issues, these changes were not persistent for more than a week at a time. Although changes in attitudes and behaviors were possible in a receiver following the peripheral route, the changes did not last.

The ELM provided communication scholars with some unique opportunities. Researchers had a flexible means for potentially explaining some paradoxical findings. Speech researchers using the approach could contend that the message content was critical for the speaker who wanted a receiver to maintain certain behavioral patterns over long periods of time, but secondary in cases where the sender sought only an immediate response. The central/peripheral dichotomy offered a new way to interpret what had previously appeared as counterintuitive findings on source credibility (McCroskey, 1966; Miller, 1964), use of evidence in a message (McCroskey, 1972), or the need for an organized message (McCroskey, 1973).

From a communication perspective, the ELM provided a viable framework by which to investigate deception's effects on persuasion. Previous work with the model, however, suggested that a subject's involvement with the topic could control which path a receiver would follow and thus, indirectly influence the effects deception might have on persuasive outcomes.

Involvement. Petty and Cacioppo concluded that before a person would follow the central path of the ELM, the recipient would need to be both able and motivated to cognitively process information about the topic. Involvement, therefore, was suggested to affect an individual's motivation to process infor-

mation about a subject. Topics viewed as having a high personal relevance should receive high amounts of elaboration. Individuals were considered more prone to cognitively process information about the topic and subsequently more likely to produce pro, con, or neutral cognitions when the subject had some direct bearing on their lives. Moreover, when the outcome was visualized as having a personal importance, these individuals were willing to expend the cognitive energies necessary to evaluate the true merits and/or values of the sender's message. Participants actively engaging in cognitive processing should be more influenced by the arguments comprising the message than the manner the senders selected for delivery of the speech.

Similarly, receivers seeing little personal relevance in a topic should experience few pressures to determine the validity of the speaker's claims. When topics seemed to be unrelated to personal values, respondents were predicted not to be as concerned about the content of the message. Instead, low involved receivers were expected to evaluate information along dimensions that would require a minimum of cognitive effort. Because their low involvement with the subject produced little motivation to critically appraise the topic, these listeners were thought to make a greater use of the peripheral cues in responding to the speakers. These receivers would be more prone to react to the way the message was delivered and the context in which it occurred than the content of the speech.

These projected relationships between the ELM and involvement have received substantial support. High involved receivers who were presumably following the central path of the model have been found to be persuaded more frequently on the basis of the quality of the arguments that comprised the message than low involved individuals (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, Cacioppo, Hesacker,

1981). Conversely, the source's attractiveness or expertise (peripheral cues) has had a much more pronounced influence on low rather than high involved participants (Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Rhine & Severance, 1970).

In summary, involvement appears to be a variable that directly affects the willingness (the motivation) of receivers to engage in central processing. When the topic is highly relevant to the listener (and comprehensible), an individual may be expected to follow the central path of the ELM. Furthermore, topics lacking such personal linkages will produce receivers who are likely to follow the peripheral path of the model. Because involvement plays such an integral role in determining the amount of cognitive processing an individual will devote to a topic, it subsequently interacts with several other variables to alter the predictions that are derived from the ELM. Two variables where these effects are most pronounced deal with argument strength and deception.

Strength of Arguments. Among the many variables that may influence the selection of the central path of the model by a receiver, the quality of the arguments that comprise a message appears to produce some of the most clearly delineated effects on the participant's behaviors. Since a listener adhering to the central route tends to compare a message with his/her existing cognitive structure, the frequency a receiver complies with a speaker's behavioral requests is thought to be a function of the type of arguments the source advances and how these compare with the responses generated by the recipient. Consistent with ELM predictions, McCroskey (1972) has found that the use of evidence in an argument has little effect on immediate persuasion, but the quality of the supporting material in favor of a speaker's position enhances long-term

attitude change regardless of the speaker's original credibility. Similarly, several researchers (Hovland, Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Miller, 1964; McCroskey, 1966) have found that the effects of source characteristics (dress, credentials, etc.) on persuasion are temporary, but that the composition of the message can be recalled long after the speaker has been forgotten.

Advocates of the cognitive response approach suggest that when a speaker employs a message that a receiver finds difficult to counterargue, the absence of those counterarguments also reduces the listener's resistance to the message. Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976) have found that when subjects were exposed to strongly worded messages they generated fewer negative thoughts and were substantially more likely to acquiesce to the speaker. Weak messages were more easily counterargued and produced significantly less attitude change even when individuals were concerned about the topic.

Similarly, Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) found that subjects who followed the central route of the model were more likely to change their attitudes as a function of the strength and type of the argument rather than by source characteristics like prestige. Conversely, they discovered that subjects who were not concerned with the topic were just as likely to alter their opinions regardless of which arguments were used. The ELM suggested that attitude change was likely to occur when a receiver was following the central route and when the strongest arguments were used by the source.

The previous work with the model did not provide any method for determining the strength of these relationships when deception was present. It seems unreasonable to assume that involved listeners will ignore all source characteristics and concentrate exclusively on the message. Nor does it follow that less involved viewers would not be influenced at least somewhat by the arguments

that comprise the speech. What is intriguing is the relationship of deception to these behavioral tendencies. Is it possible that a listener could concentrate so much on a message's content that the speaker could employ strong arguments while displaying nonverbal deception cues and be just as effective as senders who used no deception? Will less involved receivers disregard a strongly worded message if the speaker appears to be lying?

Deception. Lying holds an unusual position within society. When Norman Anderson (1967) asked respondents to rank 537 available attributes that could be associated with individuals, dishonesty and deceit were among the least desirable. Yet, evidence suggests that deception is a very natural and pervasive phenomenon. Leakey and Lewin (1978) have argued that in a developing species it may have been necessary to prevent other individuals from gaining unfair advantages over some members of a society. They have concluded that while other species (see Premack & Woodruff's work with chimpanzees, 1978) may engage in deception, it is the use of language that allowed humans to feign emotions like aggression, guilt, sympathy, and gratitude in ways that enabled them to take more from a community than they contributed. Others (Ludwig, 1965; Wile, 1942) also have supported the biological necessities of deceit. When humans were unable to meet their basic needs for survival, they resorted to a pragmatic approach and accrued life's necessities through deception.

Just as lying may be a result of natural selection, receivers have developed several techniques to determine when they should believe a speaker. Researchers suggest that under the correct set of circumstances, viewers can spot deceitful behaviors in the manner a speaker delivers a message. While several studies have suggested that a sender might be able to mask facial expressions

(De Paulo & Fisher, 1981; De Paulo, Leiphart, & Dull, 1980; Ekman, 1981), the body could still provide some valuable cues for detecting deception (Hocking et al., 1979; Cody & O'Hair, 1983). Furthermore, vocal changes have been shown to be even stronger indicators of the presence of deception (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Kraut, 1978; Hocking & leathers, 1980; O'Hair, Cody, & McLaughlin, 1981). After surveying 50 different studies on deception, De Paulo, Stone, and Lassiter (in press) have concluded that receivers are most prone to stereotype senders as being deceptive when the source shows a greater use of adaptors, more shoulder shrugs, and smiles less frequently.

This ability to distinguish between truthful and dishonest behaviors, however, appears to be limited. Listeners are not always able to spot deceptive behaviors. Although the available research tends to indicate that it is easier to prevent deception leaks on factual observations than on emotional reactions (Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, & Scheer, 1980; Ekman, Friesen, & Scheer, 1976), receivers apparently make a sender's task less difficult by operating from presumptions that the source is honest. Grice (1975) concludes that fundamental to every conversation is the assumption that speakers are endeavoring to be truthful. This presumption, when coupled with conscious attempts to mask deceptive behaviors by the speaker has suggested that the detection of deception might be only slightly greater than guesswork (De Paulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980a; 1980b; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Kraut, 1980; Miller & Burgoon, 1982). In none of these studies, however, was there any differentiation made between the listener's level of involvement with the message. The ELM would have predicted that only low involved receivers would have been attending the source's nonverbal displays. Subjects that were highly involved with the experiment should, according to the cognitive response

approach, have been much more interested in the content of the speaker's message than the manner the speech was delivered. Subsequently it was quite possible that they never saw the cues that they would use to spot the deceitful speaker.

The ELM, therefore, would not predict that all receivers would immediately discount a sender's message merely because he/she engaged in those nonverbal behaviors normally associated with lying. Specifically, the model posits that only those participants who were following the peripheral route would become more resistant to such a speaker. For low involved receivers, the quality of the arguments that comprise the message should not be especially salient, but the manner selected to deliver the speech is paramount. Should the speaker engage in behaviors thought to be indicative of deception, receivers following the peripheral route should become more resistant to the message. Individuals that are highly involved with the topic should be less concerned with the speaker's mode of delivery and more interested in the quality of the arguments that comprise the message. For these individuals, the ELM would predict that a sender's deceptive nonverbal behaviors would have very little effect on the message's overall persuasiveness. Subsequently, the following hypothesis was tested within a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design:

H1: Individuals not highly involved with a topic will show significantly more resistance to a speaker's appeals when the source engages in deceptive nonverbal displays than will participants that are highly involved with the topic.

METHOD

Eighty male and eighty female subjects were drawn from sections of a

basic speech communication course at a large midwestern university, and asked to participate in a study investigating television effects. The investigation employed a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design. Included were two continuous variables involvement (high/low) and the strength of the arguments used by the speaker (strong/weak), as well as a discrete variable, the existence of deception cues in the presentation (present/absent).

Data were collected in a small carpeted classroom located in a laboratory suite. Subjects were seated in three rows of five chairs that were spaced far enough apart to insure independent responses. A video-tape player and monitor that could be easily viewed by all of the receivers were placed approximately 4 to 4½ feet from the nearest subject.

Procedure. Subjects were asked to report to the Speech Communication Laboratory at specified times. They were introduced to the project by being told that this particular study was investigating the effects of advertising. Participants were informed that during the next hour they would be viewing an episode of a television program (Quincy) with some commercials spaced at various intervals. At the end of the program they would be asked to complete a short questionnaire.

Before beginning the tape, however, subjects were informed that some sponsors wished to provide them with some additional information about their products. This information sheet thanked the subjects for volunteering and indicated that the experimenters had been given a modest budget from which they had purchased free gifts for the participants as an expression of gratitude for their assistance. The sheet explained that at the close of the experiment, subjects would get to select their gift from an assortment of similar products.

Half the subjects were promised a chance to choose one ball-point pen from several brands. The others were told they could pick a sample box of soda crackers.

Listed below the pledged gift were product descriptions for: Ritz crackers, Meister Brau beer, Campbell's soup, World's Finest Chocolate bars, and Omega III pens. All of the descriptions were identical except that for the Omega III. On this product the description for those subjects promised the selection of pens, indicated that the product would soon be available and marketed within the city. For those subjects expecting to select a box of crackers, the description for the pen indicated that the pen was still being developed for test marketing on the east coast, and would not be available for use in the area for several years.

The introduction sheet was employed to create two distinct levels of involvement within the respondents. Similar manipulations had been found to be effective in producing both high and low levels of product involvement for subjects in previous research (Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Schumann, 1984).

After reading the introduction sheet, the papers were collected and the videotape of a single segment of a television program (Quincy) was started. At junctions where the network had placed commercials within the original film, a single advertisement was viewed by the audience.

Three of the ads the receivers viewed were taken from a basic television production class at a large midwestern university. All were thirty seconds in duration and student produced. All three advertised consumable products--Ritz Crackers, Meister Brau Beer, and World's Finest Chocolate Bars.

Additionally four thirty second versions of a fourth product (Omega III pens) were produced specifically for this study. In all ads for the pen, the

same speaker was employed. A seated male spokesman would hold a Parker Pen at a range where product identification would be impossible. After the introduction, he would place the pen on a counter in front of him and present three to five reasons why the pen should be purchased. A fixed camera was used for the duration of the commercial.

Pilot testing revealed that similar subjects (n=44) saw no significant differences in the production quality, the types of products, the visual images, or the audio qualities between the advertisements used in this study. Moreover, pilot respondents indicated that the spots were similar to those normally seen on commercial television.

Four of the ads for the Omega III utilized strong arguments and four employed weak arguments. Pilot testing (n=48) revealed that subjects considered five arguments to be exceptionally strong reasons for buying a pen. Pilot participants indicated the most persuasive reasons they would buy a pen would be: 1) a favorable recommendation from Consumer Reports; 2) no smear ink; 3) the ability to write with the pen at any angle; 4) a $1 factory rebate for trying the product; and, 5) the ink could be erased with a standard pencil eraser. Conversely, these individuals also indicated five of the arguments would not be very persuasive reasons to buy a pen. Their rankings suggested weak arguments for a pen included: 1) it was the same type of pen used by Larry Holmes; 2) President Reagan used a similar pen with which to sign bills; 3) the pen could float; 4) the pen could write at extreme temperatures; and, 5) the pen was available in leading jewelry stores.

In one half of the pen ads the speaker displayed three behaviors that have been stereotypically associated with deception (DePaulo et al., in press). During these commercials the spokesperson avoided direct eye-contact with the

camera, did not smile, and performed three postural shifts. In the other Omega III commercials the speaker avoided these acts and any other behaviors that had been typed as lying.

Subsequently, eight edited versions of the Quincy episode with the advertisements were derived. In each version the only changes in the ads were in the advertisements for the fountain pen. The content of the program and the student produced ads were not manipulated. In four of the taped versions, the Omega III commercial was the first advertisement viewed. In the other four tapes the pen advertisement was placed last. This procedure was used to control for any potential primacy/recency effects.

Immediately after viewing the final commercial the video-tape player was turned off and the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire dealing with the program and the commercials they had just viewed. Included within this dependent measure were items dealing with the subjects' viewing habits and their responses to the specific products that had been presented within the program. Participants' attitudes toward the Omega III commercial, advertisement and spokesperson were also included with the questions dealing with the Ritz Crackers, Meister Brau Beer, and the World's Finest Chocolate. In a separate section of the dependent measure entitled "Communication & Advertising," subjects were asked to respond to a variety of questions dealing with source characteristics of the product spokespersons. Along with several extraneous items (i.e. Do you think a coat and tie would make the speaker more persuasive?) subjects were asked to list for which commercial they believed the speaker's claims most and why. The respondents were also asked to list for which advertisement they accepted the claims least and why. On four other Likert-type items within the section, the participants were asked to rate the

credibility of each of the speakers in the commercials.

After all subjects had completed the forms, the dependent measures were collected and the participants were provided with a written debriefing sheet that explained the nature of the study. Respondents were asked if they had questions about the study, sworn to secrecy, and dismissed from the experimental setting.

RESULTS

The hypothesis offered that low involved receivers' responses would be based on whether the speaker appeared to be telling the truth, while highly involved viewers would be expected to ignore these cues and concentrate on the arguments that comprised the message. Data for testing the hypothesis was obtained from subjects' responses to a fountain pen advertisement (Omega III) on thirteen Likert-type items. These answers reflected the subjects' attitudes towards the product, the source, and the advertisement generally, and were compared with each other through analyses of the variances (ANOVAs).

Manipulation Checks. This study entailed two levels of involvement, argument strength, and deception. The data gathered suggested the necessary manipulations were successful.

High or low involvement with the Omega III commercial was achieved by pledging to give subjects a free sample at the conclusion of the experiment. Half the respondents were told that they would have an opportunity to select one of several types of pens and the other half a chance to choose a box of crackers. Theoretically, those individuals promised the choice of pens should

be more involved with the Omega advertisements than those individuals expecting the crackers. The data tended to support such a conclusion. Subjects expecting to receive a pen at the conclusion of the experiment were significantly more interested in the advertisement (M=4.75) than those waiting to choose a box of crackers (M=3.74), $F(1,159)=9.21$, $P<.01$. Similarly, there were also significant differences reported by the participants regarding their overall interests in the product. Those waiting for pens were more interested in the Omega III (M=4.98) than individuals expecting to receive the crackers at the conclusion of the study (M=4.01), $F(1,159)=5.92$, $P<.01$.

Previous pilot testing (n=44) indicated that the various arguments employed by the Omega spokesman would be perceived as being of different overall quality. Experimental respondents hearing weak arguments were less likely to rate the Omega III as the best commercial, less prone to rate the speaker as the most believable, and more likely to rate the speaker as the least believable spokesperson among the four.

TABLE 1
MANIPULATION CHECK FOR ARGUMENT STRENGTH
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS

	Strong	Weak
VARIABLE:		
Best Ad	28%	18%
Most Believable Speaker	30%	14%
Least Believable Speaker	39%	42%

N for Strong Arguments = 80

N for Weak Arguments = 80

Manipulation checks suggested that subjects evaluated the product, commercial, and the source differently when deception cues were present. Respondents viewing deception cues in the Omega III advertisements were less likely to rank the commercial as the best of four spots, more likely to consider it to be the worst advertisement, less likely to believe the Omega III speaker, and more likely to find the speaker to be the least believable.

TABLE 2
MANIPULATION CHECK FOR DECEPTION
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS

VARIABLE:	Deception N=80	No Deception N=80
Best Ad	22%	30%
Worst Ad	44%	18%
Most Believable Speaker	18%	39%
Least Believable Speaker	49%	21%

Hypothesis. The hypothesis proposed that individuals not involved with the product would be less willing to acquiesce to the speaker's requests when he behaved deceptively. These deceptive displays, however, were not predicted to affect those respondents that were highly involved with the message since they were presumably concentrating on the arguments that comprised the message. Given the ELM prediction that low involved receivers should be more influenced by source cues than message content, support for the hypothesis required that an interaction effect between the deception and involvement conditions be demonstrated. Deception cues should, theoretically, make a large difference in the manner low involved receivers rated the source and only a small difference for the highly involved participants.

As indicated in Table 3, deception did play a major role in the overall ratings of the product, commercial, and source by the low involved respondents. Analyses of the variances revealed that the advertisement including the deceptive behaviors received lower ratings than the ad presented without the deception cues. Conversely, highly involved subjects did not seem to be influenced very much when they viewed the same displays.

TABLE 3
INVOLVEMENT * DECEPTION INTERACTIONS

	Hi Involved		Lo Involved	
	Deception	No Deception	Deception	No Deception
VARIABLE:				
Interest in Commercial	4.65	4.85	2.62	4.85*
Interest in Product	5.25	4.73	3.30	4.73*
Degree of Satisfaction	6.45	6.73	4.05	6.43*
Good/Bad Product	6.55	6.83	4.28	6.53*
Favorable/Unfavorable Product View	6.23	6.78	3.85	6.53*
Willing to try Product	5.13	5.00	3.13	4.98*
Willing to Seek Product	3.50	4.05	2.65	3.75
Overall Ad.	3.95	4.43	2.70	4.75*
Overall Product	5.18	5.60	3.65	5.40*
Willing to use Product	5.00	5.20	3.40	4.95
Advertisement Effectiveness	4.10	5.43	1.78	4.38*
Belief of Speaker	5.40	5.60	4.18	5.53
Credibility of Speaker	5.18	5.63	3.25	5.18*

*=P<.05
N=160
9 pt. Likert scales (1=Least/9=most)

DISCUSSION

The hypothesis predicted that deception would produce negative ratings from low involved viewers, but that high involved participants would ignore such displays and base their assessments largely on the quality of the arguments presented. Petty and Cacioppo (1979) reported that when a topic has low personal relevance, people are less motivated to engage in the considerable cognitive work necessary to evaluate relevant arguments and they tend to rely more on peripheral cues to evaluate the advocacy.

Thus, the ELM predicted that attitude changes resulting from the peripheral route would "occur" because the person associates the attitude issue or object with positive or negative cues or makes simple inferences about the merits of various simple cues in the persuasive context" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; p. 78). The hypothesis, therefore, argued that seeing an individual that appeared to be behaving deceptively would be interpreted as a negative cue by uninvolved receivers. Since assessment by non-involved individuals tended to follow the peripheral route of the ELM, such observations were predicted to yield lower ratings than when the source did not display such cues.

This particular ELM prediction received unequivocal support. Whenever deception cues were embedded into the Omega III advertisement involved subjects consistently rated the speaker, commercial, and the product lower than when the cues were absent. This study clearly suggested that the awareness of deception plays an important role in establishing the manner individuals respond to non-relevant products. Unless an audience is extremely involved with the speaker's topic, senders would be well advised not to behave in any manner that might suggest deception to their receivers. This data indicated that low involved subjects

will detect stereotypically deceptive displays and will resist the claims advanced by the deceptive speaker. The findings indicated that at least among low involved receivers, nonverbal displays were instrumental in determining a source's sincerity.

The ratings of the Omega III by high involved participants did not appear to be greatly influenced by the presence or absence of deception cues. They tended to rate the product more on the basis of the quality of arguments comprising the message than on the behaviors of the source.

These findings generate specific implications for both deception and persuasion research. Most contemporary research has focused on recognizing deceptive nonverbal behaviors. The works by Miller and his associates (Stiff & Miller, 1984; Bauchner, Kaplan, & Miller, 1980; Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980; 1982), O'Hair & Cody (1983), Zuckerman (1983; 1984), and Kraut (1978) have assumed that receivers who spotted nonverbal acts associated with deception would automatically resist a source's behavioral requests. Accordingly, a large part of these researchers' efforts have been focused on cataloging which nonverbal displays are indicative of deception. This investigation, however, indicates that there are situations in which receivers ignore deception and base their assessments largely on the quality of the arguments presented. For highly involved respondents, the presence of deception cues is an insuffucient justification for resisting commercial messages. Contemporary scholars, therefore, should recognize that even if a correspondence between certain nonverbal acts and deception is eventually established, such discoveries do not guarantee any behavioral changes for receivers that are highly involved with the topic.

This study also holds some implications for persuasive researchers wishing to employ the ELM. The investigation illustrates that deception behaves like

other cues for subjects following the peripheral route. The acceptance of the hypothesis clearly indicates that subjects not involved with the topic disliked speakers who appeared to behave deceptively. While this finding is consistent with Petty and Cacioppo's (1984b) research on source cues, it also tests the ELM predictions with a variable that had not been previously examined.

Krugman (1965) has argued that television is a very non-involving medium. The findings of this work would suggest that potential advertisers would maximize their overall persuasive appeals only if their commercials' spokespersons did not display any deceptive nonverbal cues or could dramatically increase the relevance of the product to the viewers. If receivers tend to base their assessment of products largely on peripheral cues then researchers interested in consumer behaviors should recognize that deception has the potential to significantly alter a receiver's response to television commercials.

Future studies, however, are necessary to distinguish precisely the role deception plays on both types (non-involved/involved) or receivers. If less involved viewers tend to respond negatively to deceptive displays then work is needed to distinguish precisely which cues evoke the stereotype that a speaker may be lying. The efforts of contemporary researchers should provide some significant insights. This study suggests that a receiver need not be engaging in deception, but merely create such an impression in the listeners' minds to produce the predicted resistance. Until the manner viewers use in making such discriminations is understood, then it will be difficult to advise advertisers, spokespersons, or anyone else which cues should be avoided when dealing with low involved audiences.

Similarly, where receivers are most interested in the speaker's topic, it would be prudent to suggest that future scholars center their efforts on the

role of strong arguments on central processing. Petty and Cacioppo (1979) have suggested that the reasons that strong arguments are more persuasive than weak ones to individuals following the central path is that the strong arguments are more capable of reducing any counterarguments formed during cognitive processing. In recent works, however, they (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984a) have found that the mere presence of strong arguments can trigger a counterargument response within involved receivers. If strong arguments can cause an involved individual to counterargue then it is plausible that deceptive cues might produce a similar effect. All of the previous research with the ELM has employed speakers that gave their receivers no reasons to doubt their sincerity. If the cues do increase the number of negative thoughts associated with a message then there should be some reduction in the overall assessment of messages that use deceptive sources even for the high involved receivers. Such an effect was not observed in this investigation. Its absence would challenge future scholars to explain the exact effects deception may have on the cognitive processing of information.

Regardless of deception's effects on involved receivers, this study suggests that responses to lying are hardly unidimensional. To treat them as such will restrict our understanding of both persuasion and nonverbal behaviors. Subsequently, it is offered that the best method of understanding the effects deceivers have on both areas may truly reside in our abilities as researchers to explain the interface between persuasion and nonverbal communication. Only then will a witness' testimony before a jury, a President's proclamations of noninvolvement, or the effects of an advertiser's claims be possibly understood.

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